"Because They Want Nice Things": Prostitution, Consumerism, and Culture in
                    Thailand by Jeffrey, Leslie
"Because They Want Nice Things": 
Prostitution, Consumerism, and Culture in Thailand1 
Leslie Jeffrey 
ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the ways in which women in prostitution in Thailand have been positioned as threats to national identity through 
the "consumerism critique" of prostitution. The paper argues that this discourse is a product of the symbolic role played by women and 
the peasantry in anchoring national identity in a globalized era. 
RESUME 
Cet article explore les moyens par lesquels les femmes engagees dans la prostitution en Thai'lande ont ete placees comme danger a 
l'identite nationale par l'entremise de la « critique consumerisme» de la prostitution. L'article indique que ce discours est le produit 
du role symbolique joue par les femmes et par la paysannerie qui ancrent l'identite nationale dans une epoque de mondialisation. 
The intensification of globalization and 
increasing integration of women's labour into the 
global economy has resulted not only in economic 
burdens for women, but also growing tensions over 
women's symbolic role as bearers of national 
culture and identity. Similarly, the growing gap 
between urban and rural areas is experienced not 
only as an economic divide but also a symbolic one, 
in which only the sophisticated urban areas can -
and should - enjoy the benefits of modernization 
while the rural areas, as the seat of traditional 
culture, should retain their "traditional purity." The 
discursive link between prostitution and 
consumerism in modern Thailand serves to remind 
us of the role that the debates over tradition vs. 
modernity and national culture vs. globalization can 
play in limiting women's political agency, even as 
a society moves into a new era of growth and 
"democratization." 
In late 20th century Thailand, the 
increasing commodification and commercialization 
of everyday life, particularly as it was evidenced in 
the rural areas, was a source of growing national 
anxiety. "Consumerism" summed up the religious 
and political critiques of the state of Thai society 
following the boom years of 1985 through to the 
early 1990s, which brought with them phenomenal 
amounts of foreign investment: a huge tourism 
industry; a decline in agricultural production and an 
emphasis on export-driven industry, rapid urban 
expansion, and the growth of an increasingly 
prosperous middle class. Consumerism was 
regularly pointed to as the underlying cause of what 
were considered to be the outstanding problems of 
Thai society - corruption, prostitution, the drug 
trade, and environmental degradation. This anxiety 
over consumerism was particularly pertinent for 
Thai peasant women who joined the steady stream 
of migrants into the urban commercial centres to 
work in the sex-trade sector.2 The cultural 
consternation of the Bangkok middle class focussed 
on these women as emblematic of the loss of 
national culture, a culture most notably embodied in 
the good, Buddhist peasant woman supporting 
"nation, king and religion" through her maintenance 
of the family and traditional customs. The flow of 
increasingly impoverished young women out of the 
rural areas into the urban sex-trade in order to 
support their families came to be viewed as a 
product of the degradation of traditional morals and 
culture leading young women to "sell their bodies" 
because, "they just want nice things." This 
"consumerism critique" came to dominate popular 
accounts of the booming prostitution trade in 
Thailand in the 1990s. 
Certainly, in downtown Bangkok, 
surrounded by mega-malls, Western restaurants, 
luxury cars and high-priced fashion shops, this 
charge of "rampant consumerism" makes intuitive 
sense. When used to explain prostitution, however, 
the term does not refer to the increasing number of 
men with disposable income who can afford to buy 
high priced sexual services, nor to the owners and 
procurers who make large fortunes on the provision 
of these services; indeed, their kind rarely appear in 
discussions about prostitution. The charge of 
"consumerism" is often aimed at women, even as 
they are targeted by advertisers as both a market 
and a mode of advertising. In Thailand in particular, 
it is a critique aimed at prostitutes themselves - who 
are seen to have an alarming penchant for clothing, 
jewelry and make-up. It is also aimed at their 
(usually peasant) families, who, with the 
remittances from their daughters, build new houses 
(from modern construction materials rather than the 
traditional teak) and buy consumer goods. While it 
has very recently been acknowledged that young, 
middle-class, university students - both male and 
female - are joining the ranks of sex-workers in 
order to increase their disposable income or to take 
part in the "exciting," modern and globalized world 
of sex and money, this has been much less the focus 
of attention than the overall "cultural decline" of the 
peasantry and peasant women in particular. 
It seems ironic, to say the least, that the 
fingers being pointed at prostitute women are 
invariably well-manicured, belonging to well-off 
members of the middle and upper classes. I argue, 
therefore, that there is a displacement of the 
consumerism critique onto women, particularly 
peasant women engaged in prostitution, because of 
the symbolic role of peasant women in embodying 
national culture. This process has opened up 
political space for some women but shut it down for 
others. Elite women have been able to negotiate for 
themselves a political role as arbiters of tradition 
and modernity and instructors of the rural (female) 
population in the maintenance of national culture. 
At the same time, this particular construction of the 
prostitution issue has sublimated the problems of 
growing poverty in rural areas, the exploitation of 
female labour in the "new economy" and the 
potential abuse of young women in the global 
sex-trade. As well, prostitute women's agency in 
seeking out a better life for themselves and their 
families has been read as "greedy consumerism." As 
a result, this discourse silences the claims of new 
women's groups and sex-workers who argue that 
prostitution should be decriminalized and the 
working conditions of prostitution addressed.3 Thus, 
even in the new middle class-led democracy of the 
1990s, and despite their being the subject of a great 
deal of public debate and concern, prostitute 
women, both because of their gender and class, are 
marginalized political actors. This article will trace 
the development of the "consumerism critique" and 
its implications for women in prostitution. 
WOMEN AND THE NATION 
The anxiety about the loss of culture is 
particularly acute with regard to women because of 
their association with the maintenance of culture. 
National identity and culture are often considered to 
be embodied in women, as mothers of the race or as 
primary socializers of young citizens (Yuval-Davis 
and Anthias 1989, 7). Women are also used as 
symbols of the (feminine) nation that the (manly) 
state must protect through, for instance, war (Sharpe 
1996, 100). Women's presumed embodiment of the 
nation has resulted in restrictive measures on their 
movement and sexuality, in order to avoid 
"dilution" of national identity. The investment of 
female bodies with such heavy national symbolism 
makes women's sexual and social agency highly 
problematic because their actions are quickly read 
as a challenge to the national order. Women who 
work in prostitution, therefore, are often the subject 
of intense concern for their unruly sexual behaviour. 
Women who use their bodies for other than the 
designated national purpose are a threat to national 
identity. 
The symbolic role of the rural, peasant 
woman in Thailand can be traced through 
Thailand's political development in the latter half of 
the 1900s, from military authoritarianism 
(interrupted only briefly by democracy in the 
mid-1970s) to established democracy in the 
mid-1990s. In the 1960s both radical and 
conservative nationalists used peasant women as 
metaphors for "real Thai culture" and the changes 
wrought in rural society, particularly among the 
women, as metaphors for the damage to Thai 
tradition being brought about by Westernization, 
capitalist penetration and American military 
presence. In one example of this symbolic discourse 
- a short-story by well-known cultural nationalist 
Suchit Wongthes entitled "SecondNature"-women, 
both from Bangkok and the rural village, are 
symbolic of Thai culture and its corruption. In this 
story, as Benedict Anderson explains: " A 
countryman at heart (or at least so he thinks), [the 
hero] dreams of 'showing up' the corrupted 
(Americanized, by implication) women of Bangkok 
by marrying the simple village girl he had left 
behind back home" (Anderson 1985,45). Hereturns 
to his village to visit his sweetheart and finds his 
village, and his sweetheart, completely changed. 
The rural girlfriend, however, appears pitifully 
ignorant in her attempts to mimic urban culture, 
reinforcing the notion that the peasantry were too 
unsophisticated to deal with modern culture. Suchit 
writes: 
He wanted to tell to her [sic] that 
stretchpants were repulsive; but he held 
back, reflecting that he still had a few days 
left to explain to her that Bangkok boys 
with education and good taste regarded all 
girls who wore stretchpants as low-grade 
whores; for any girl who clothed her body 
with such provocative tightness must be 
basically hard and far too forward. The 
young men were all agreed that a real 
Siamese beauty would never be brazen 
enough to display her bag of sexual tricks 
like that before the public. 
(Wongthes 1985, 98-99) 
In this passage Suchit links women's consumption 
of Western goods, particularly clothing, to an 
impure sexuality and lack of Thai-ness (no "real 
Siamese beauty" would wear those clothes). 
The link between sexual impurity and 
cultural impurity was further reinforced by the 
particularities of the American presence in Thailand 
during this time. This linkage was articulated most 
clearly by the pro-democracy forces that grew up in 
the same period. Students demonstrating against the 
presence of American military troops in Thailand 
during the 1960s pointed to the sexual relations 
between American military men and local women 
as proof of the degrading effect of the American 
presence on Thai culture. With the arrival of 
thousands of American servicemen in the 1960s the 
practice of prostitution expanded rapidly and took 
on a more blatant form than seen previously. The 
Americans, the students argued, were the cause of 
"the rotten Thai society in which we are now living, 
one with 'hired wives,' prostitutes and half- breed 
children of all colours" (Morell and Samudavimjia 
1981,165). By implication, women who worked as 
hired wives and prostitutes were endangering the 
body politic and the reproduction of the Thai race. 
Women in prostitution had become emblematic of 
cultural decline. 
The importance of the peasantry in 
national identity was extended and entrenched by 
the military. The military government that returned 
to power after a brief period of open democracy was 
forcefully ended in 1976 had learned that 
co-optation, rather than coercion, of the rural 
citizenry was perhaps the best path to maintaining 
stability and ending the threat of peasant rebellion. 
In particular, factions within the military had 
realized that the previous era had failed to bring the 
peasantry into the national agenda, hence their 
willingness to join the so-called "communist 
insurgency" of the 1960s and 1970s. The military 
began programs to pacify the countryside by 
integrating the peasant community into Thai 
national identity. With the support of the 
bureaucracy, the military carried out intensive 
campaigns such as the Village Scouts program that 
worked to indoctrinate peasants into the ideology of 
"nation, religion and King" (Bowie 1997). The 
returning military-led government built its 
legitimacy on its connection to the peasantry as the 
"real Thai people." It stitched the psyche of the 
nation back together from the violence and rapid 
change of the 1970s through its creation of a united 
Thai identity, based in the countryside. It declared 
1980 the "Year of the Farmer" and established a 
National Identity Board, which - even as the army 
continued to battle rural uprisings and rural 
migrants poured into the cities to escape rural 
poverty - boasted: 
The village is a peaceful place, its slow 
pace reflecting the serene, unassuming 
nature of the villagers themselves... most 
farmers are content to earn enough to 
support their families ...wealth is not 
something most villagers actually crave.... 
The natural affection Thai villagers feel 
for their land minimizes population 
migrations. Moreover, villagers have little 
ambition to change their lifestyles. 
(Pasuk and Baker 1995, 319. 
Emphasis added) 
A peaceful and contented country as 
represented by the rural people was re-established 
through the military's "beneficent" guiding hand. So 
was their "natural" adherence to and affection for 
their country and their way of life. As Craig 
Reynolds has pointed out, "the current official 
formulations of what is quintessentially Thai never 
fail to include the peasant and the village" (1991, 
15). 
This national redefinition had particular 
implications for the thousands of rural women who 
were streaming to the cities to find work in the 
sex-trade industry in the face of rising rural 
impoverishment. They were quickly emblazoned on 
the national imagination as both victims of a foreign 
invader and betrayers of cultural purity deserving of 
both protection and punishment. Either way, they 
needed to be educated back into being "good Thai 
women" in order to protect Thai culture. 
PROSTITUTION AND ELITE-LED 
WOMEN'S PROGRAMS 
Like the students, government and elites 
treated prostitutes as symptomatic of cultural 
decline. Elite women, who designed and carried out 
the programs to stem the flow of rural women into 
prostitution, defined themselves in terms of their 
contribution to national culture and as staunch 
defenders of national identity, and they built their 
authority in terms of their ability to "re-enculturate" 
rural Thai women. Clearly drawing the distinction 
between elite protection of culture and peasant 
susceptibility to foreign influence, one female 
professor argued in 1977 "the bad [foreign] 
influence causes a section of Thai women, 
especially the poor and the ignorant, to sink down 
to the lowest level. The Thai Government and the 
more fortunate Thai women realize the seriousness 
of the situation and are looking for a solution to the 
problem" (Poolthupya 1977, 22). 
Programs to divert women from 
prostitution, such as the one initiated by the 
Committee for the Promotion of the Welfare of 
Women (CPWW), were designed to inculcate what 
elites considered to be "traditional Thai values." 
The courses included not only skills training (in 
housewifery as well as manners and morals) but 
"Thai history and culture, comparative religions, the 
Thai language, and the concept of'Land of Dharma 
and Prosperity'" (CPWW 1989, 4). According to 
Philip Hirsch, the Land of Dharma and Prosperity 
program was itself part of the government's 
program to bring the rural areas into the national 
ideological sphere and under the centre's political 
control. The program was "based on ideological 
training sessions that emphasise unity, individual 
virtue through abstinence from abayamuk, the 
Buddhist vices of drink, gambling, and adultery" 
(Hirsch 1991, 330). Adherence to these Buddhist 
values would, according to the government, usher in 
a new era of peace and prosperity. Thus the 
anti-prostitution programs were shaped by the 
military's and the elite's agenda to bring the 
countryside into Thai national identity as defined by 
urban elites. 
Elite women, closely linked to the 
governing circle, positioned themselves as the 
gatekeepers between the modern and the traditional. 
According to elite women, peasant women needed 
the elites to guide them through the landmines of 
modernity without losing their "traditional identity." 
Peasant women were identified as lacking in moral 
fibre and motivation. From a three year study of 
prostitution one elite-run organization concluded 
that the lack of education beyond Prathom (Level) 
6 left village girls unequipped with either skills or 
a "sense of direction with which to face the future" 
- a lack which left them open to becoming victims 
of circumstance and led into "undesirable" 
situations, particularly upon migration to the cities 
(CPWW 1989, 1). The instigation of change is 
clearly envisioned as coming from the elite Thai 
women who convert "passive and unresponsive" 
village girls into "self-confident" women who at the 
same time have "good deportment" and "dress 
appropriately" - i.e., hold true to "Thai customs" 
(CPWW 1989, 9). Thus, elite Thai women and 
through them, peasant women, have successfully 
negotiated the opposition between (Western) 
modernization and (Thai) tradition. 
Girls who resisted instruction were 
interpreted as lazy rather than resistant to a process 
that substituted "cultural training" for economic and 
social empowerment. For instance, when village 
girls resisted the C P W W program for domestic 
service training, the CPWW reported that "village 
girls are not interested in the course, considering it 
degrading to serve in the homes" and "many of the 
girls do not wish to work. They are accustomed to 
poverty and inertia" (CPWW 1989, 27 - 28). As 
Mary Beth Mills points out, however, "domestic 
service is the lowest paid form of urban 
employment and carries little aura of modernity 
(excluding new domestic technology) which is one 
reason why village women seek urban employment 
in the first place" (n.d., 8). Women who needed to 
support their families and who were seeking some 
of the promise of the modern era for themselves 
would understandably find domestic service 
"degrading." That they did so shows some of their 
refusal of the strengthening grip of the elite on the 
peasantry. However, their efforts were read by the 
elite as "misguided" at best. The women in 
development programs of the 1980s continued to 
echo the belief that peasant women required the 
careful guidance of their betters in order to ensure 
their maintenance of traditional culture while 
benefiting from the changes wrought by 
modernization. 
THE THOROUGHLY MODERN MIDDLE 
CLASS 
The 1990s marked the passage of Thai 
political organization from semi-authoritarian/ 
semi-democratic into a wider middle class-based 
democracy. While members of the old elite class 
remained the key power-brokers, the new middle 
class of urban professionals and white collar 
workers became a new and formidable political 
force. Despite this shift in political power at the 
centre, the relationship between the urban and rural 
communities remained weighted toward the centre. 
Indeed, the middle class was able to consolidate its 
power over the rural areas, in part, through its 
interpretation of social "problems" such as 
prostitution as a product of rural backwardness and 
consumer greed. Thus, other democratic groups 
such as peasant organizations, which included large 
numbers of women, that demanded economic and 
political rights for the rural areas, and women's 
groups who sympathized with sex-workers' 
demands for better working conditions and 
decriminalization, were silenced through this 
particular interpretation of the nature of rural 
communities. 
The growth of a "modern middle class" has 
occurred quickly in Thailand. In Bangkok, this class 
numbered nearly two million by 1986, up from two 
hundred thousand in 1960 (Paribatra 1993, 884). In 
the boom period beginning in 1986 their numbers 
increased rapidly. Pasuk estimates that the "middle 
class" accounted for over five million people by the 
end of the 1980s (1993,30). In 1993 Sukhumbhand 
Paribatra described this new Thai middle class as, 
mostly young (ages 25-35); well educated 
(bachelor degrees or equivalent); exposed 
to "modern," Western-influenced culture; 
and employed in the professions in 
executive, managerial, administrative, or 
technical positions. A typical member of 
this class has a small family, a working 
spouse, and a two-bedroom house in a 
housing estate paid for with a long-term 
loan. He or she is predisposed to shop for 
food in modern supermarkets, travel, read 
newspapers and magazines, listen to radio 
and television, and i f not already owning 
one, planning to own a car and credit card. 
(1993, 884) 
The growth of the new middle class has 
been accompanied by increasing consumption, 
particularly the consumption of foreign goods. This 
consumption of foreign goods produced a great deal 
of middle-class angst over national culture and 
identity. Articles on the loss of Thai culture and the 
increase in cosmopolitan consumerism appeared 
regularly in middle-class newspapers. As Kasian 
Tejapira explains it, unlike in the student era where 
nationalism was linked to national commodity 
consumption, Thai-ness has now been "liberated" 
from any "specific national or ethnic 
commodity-referents" making it a "free-floating 
signifier" rather than a grounded identity (2001, 
153). The anxiety over this development can only 
be assuaged for the middle class if there is a 
population that remains tangibly linked to national 
culture. The peasantry, therefore, becomes 
increasingly important in grounding what has 
become a "free-floating" identity for the middle 
class. 
At the same time, the middle class looks 
down upon the chaobaan (villagers) as uneducated 
and untrustworthy. The gap, both ideological and 
economic, between the urban middle class and the 
rural peasants widened over the 1980s. The 
middle-class urbanites sought increased political 
participation and an end to corruption in 
government while rural peasants were becoming 
increasingly reliant on the largesse of elite and 
government corruption. This division put the 
peasantry and the modernizing middle class on 
opposite sides of political struggles over 
governmental change. During the 1980s the bonds 
created through the Village Scout movement - as 
well as other programs linking military and 
conservative elites to the rural peasantry - became 
part of a system of maintaining rural support for 
particular politicians. Local "godfathers" involved 
in illegal businesses, and protected by members of 
the military and government officials, arranged 
vote-buying schemes for politicians requiring rural 
support. The provincial areas accounted for over 
eighty percent of the seats in the National 
Assembly. In this period the newspapers 
increasingly referred to "dark influences" to suggest 
the involvement of the godfathers in government 
and business affairs (Pasuk and Baker 1995, 
336-37). 
This rural-military "dark influence" 
connection is the subject of a great deal of 
resentment by the urban middle class, which has 
often seen its political aspirations founder on the 
basis of rural voting power. It blames peasants who 
sell their votes for the continuation of "old style" 
politics and the resulting failure to develop a 
modern, efficient public sector. For the peasant 
class, the godfather system provides the benefits 
unavailable from the state itself as the godfathers 
provide loans and gifts for social needs such as 
weddings, local charities and public works (Pasuk 
and Baker 1995, 334-35). As James Ockey has 
pointed out, with the widening gap between rich 
and poor "no matter which parties are in 
government, the focus on the ability of individual 
candidates to deliver specific benefits prior to the 
election - cash, donations to temples, road or bridge 
building - makes perfect sense....What the middle 
classes perceive as 'corruption' can be seen as one 
small benefit that parliamentary rule has brought to 
the poor" (2001,319-20). 
Middle class Bangkokians, however, have 
grown tired of the continuing traffic jams, the 
seemingly irresolvable pollution problem and the 
problems of shakedowns, corruption and bribery by 
police and officials (Basham 1993, 15-17). 
Increasingly, the middle class views itself as the 
modernizing force of Thailand, which should have 
political power in order to guide the country into a 
rational, efficient and prosperous future. The 
peasantry, on the other hand, are not viewed as 
capable of understanding the needs of running a 
modern nation, hence it is best left in the hands of 
the "technocratic" elites and modern managers. 
This distrust of the peasantry is played out 
in the struggle to maintain national identity. Thus, 
although peasants have become icons of "true 
Thai-ness" they are also viewed as the ones "most 
at risk of losing their culture and need to be policed 
to ensure that they not become Westernized" 
(Montgomery, 1996). This contradictory position 
escalates the sense of anxiety over the maintenance 
of cultural identity and ensures that the new middle 
class remains in control of that identity even if it is 
"embodied" in the peasantry. Peasant women, 
despite their political activism in peasant 
organizations and their willingness to voice 
demands as urban workers, become the object of 
political concern and control to protect cultural 
identity rather than political subjects. 
PROSTITUTION, CONSUMERISM AND 
NATIONAL CULTURE 
The "consumerism" critique of prostitute 
women, therefore, reflects these same concerns to 
police the maintenance of national culture. 
Prostitute women are, most visibly, rural women 
who have come into the urban areas to escape the 
poverty of the countryside and often to provide for 
their families. Both as peasants and as women, they 
are emblematic of national culture. Prostitution, 
therefore, is regularly read as symptomatic of the 
loss of culture through Westernization, as one 
Bangkok Post editorial read: "Art, tradition and 
culture are the root of society. Once the root is 
severed, people lose their knowledge of their own 
roots and rapidly accept a new culture, usually from 
the West, aggravating social problems such as 
prostitution" (Montgomery 1996). 
Indeed, media coverage of the prostitution 
issue since the early 1980s has focussed on the 
"foreign" aspects of the trade - tourists coming to 
Thailand, Thai women going to Japan or Europe -
emphasizing the interaction between Thai women 
and foreign men and cultures. Throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, non-governmental organizations 
working on the prostitution issue raised public 
awareness over the exploitation of women in 
prostitution, but - following their intellectual roots 
in the student movement - they also focussed on the 
issue of foreign involvement through tourism and 
international "trafficking in women."4 In reality, 
tourism and international trafficking/migration 
accounted for a small, though important, proportion 
of the prostitution industry. However, the focus on 
tourism and trafficking served to reinforce the 
association of women with national culture and the 
degradation of both through contact with 
Westernization. In drawing attention to the 
exploitation of women in prostitution, rural women 
drawn into the sex-trade were often characterized 
simply as victims of "evil foreigners" with no 
agency of their own. 
It soon became clear to the organized 
women's groups working on the trafficking issue 
that Thai women were not simply victims of evil 
traffickers and foreigners but that there was a 
certain amount of agency involved in becoming 
and/or remaining a prostitute - despite the obviously 
l imit ing circumstance of poverty. One 
Bangkok-based women's group, the Foundation for 
Women, found that when some women were 
deported back to Thailand they would seek ways to 
return to Europe or Japan or wherever they had 
been because it was the only way they could see to 
make good money. Researchers for the Foundation 
were taken aback by the attitudes of villagers who 
defined victimization in the sex-trade as "working 
for nothing," and argued that i f women continue to 
send good money home they are clearly 
"successful" not "trafficked" nor victimized (FFW 
1996, 58). Indeed, a 1996 study on prostitution 
conducted by the Foundation discovered that the 
increased earning power of women in prostitution 
may, in fact, be changing women's status within 
some village communities. The researchers pointed 
out that "women's increasingly obvious contribution 
to the improvement in the family's economic status 
through labour migration has changed [the 
decision-making power of senior males] somewhat. 
In some families, women are now considered the 
head of the household and women have a greater 
share of the decision-making power. Even parents 
have come to respect their daughters" (FFW 1996, 
58). And, while women's groups recognized that 
successful involvement in the sex-trade was not 
creating a sea-change in attitudes towards, or the 
overall status of, rural women, they increasingly 
came to recognize the need to respect women's 
agency in the sex-trade and the need to listen to the 
women's own demands for better working 
conditions. In a 1996 meeting to discuss proposed 
changes to the law governing prostitution in 
Thailand, participating sex-workers argued against 
criminalizing prostitution, stating that what they 
wanted, far from being "rescued," was protection 
under the labour law: legitimate work contracts 
specifying work hours and ensuring access to 
welfare; benefits and medical check-ups; reduction 
of working hours; minimum wage guarantees and 
access to education (Sakboon 1996, A5). 
Groups such as the Foundation came to 
define the issue of prostitution not as one of sexual 
exploitation per se, but as an issue of labour rights. 
Similarly, EMPOWER, the organization for 
sex-workers in Thailand, has continued to campaign 
for safe working conditions for women in 
prostitution rather than rescuing or reforming them. 
The Thai-based, intemationally-focussed, Global 
Alliance Against Trafficking in Women has also 
recognized prostitution as a form of labour in a 
world of constrained choices for poor women in the 
developing world, which must be distinguished 
from "forced" prostitution and "trafficking in 
women" which results from deceit and the use of 
force. A l l of these organizations, while not 
necessarily entirely in agreement with each other or 
the broader international sex-workers' rights 
movement, have rejected approaches to 
understanding women in prostitution in Thailand 
that characterize them as either "victims" or 
"criminals" and have begun to focus on the need to 
address working conditions in the sex-trade and to 
give prostitute women voice. 
Indeed the relative independence of many 
women working in prostitution, particularly those 
involved in the tourist-oriented trade, may be 
precisely what is being targeted by the 
"consumerism" critique. This "brazenness" 
contradicts the dictates of middle-class and elite 
society, that peasant women should be guided by 
their betters. Prostitute women have refused to stay 
within their "proper" roles, consorting with both the 
modern and the foreign outside the control of the 
elites that seek to guide them. "Symbols" are never 
supposed to have agency. Indeed, the very 
importance of a "symbol" is in its silence, in its 
availability to others to invoke as they see fit. Any 
agency on the part of those who are invoked as 
symbols, therefore, must be interpreted in such a 
way that it disciplines its practitioners back into 
their "proper" (and silent) roles. By interpreting the 
agency of prostitute women merely as consumerism 
or greed, the consumerism critique effectively 
silences the complex realities of prostitutes' lives 
and their political demands. 
At one level, the consumerism explanation 
of prostitution silences the structural issue of 
poverty by turning those who try to survive from 
prostitution into the "undeserving poor," suggesting 
that their suffering stems from their greed and 
improper attitudes rather than the poor economic 
conditions in the countryside which are the result of 
government policies emphasizing production for 
export. That women would engage in prostitution 
simply for "consumer goods" erases the fact that 
even though prostitution can provide a better 
income than factory or domestic work, the greatest 
percentage of the money generated from each 
transaction does not end up in the pocket of the 
sex-worker. It goes to owners and middle-men, as 
well as the officials that have to be paid off, given 
the formal illegality of prostitution itself. Prostitute 
women from the Northern part of the country in 
particular often send the largest portion of their 
incomes back to their villages to support their 
families - fulfilling their roles as "dutiful 
daughters." At the same time, the consumerism 
critique repeats a stereotype of women from the 
North (who predominate in the prostitution 
industry) asjai oon (softhearted/headed) and in love 
with beautiful things. This characterization of 
Northern Thai women erases the underlying sense 
of duty that Northern women feel to provide for 
their families. This stereotype is precisely what lies 
behind the demand for Northern women by Thai 
customers. 
Further, characterizing the prostitute 
woman as consumerism-driven undermines recent 
attempts to recognize the agency of young women 
in entering the prostitution industry by translating 
that agency as misguided and selfish - a betrayal of 
her cultural heritage and her role in preserving it. 
Young women in prostitution continue to be read as 
in need of guidance and/or punishment rather than 
as self-interpreting agents who deserve a political 
voice and increased control over their own lives. A 
1996 law designed to address the prostitution 
problem reflects this approach. It punishes both 
prostitutes and parents who sell their children into 
prostitution - rather than focussing on the broader 
causes of prostitution and listening to the demands 
of prostitutes themselves for the decriminalization 
of prostitution and better working conditions. To 
interpret sex-workers as selfish consumers denies 
them a place as political agents who have problems 
and solutions that they want addressed by the larger 
community. 
CONCLUSION 
The condemnation of prostitute women as 
driven by consumerism is a reflection of the anxiety 
over the apparent loss of "traditional culture" and 
national identity in the current era of rapid 
globalization. Women often have a symbolic role as 
bearers of national culture that can result in the 
close circumscription of their activities. Prostitution 
is particularly threatening because it signals 
women's failure to stay within their prescribed roles 
thereby endangering the "reproduction of the 
nation" both physically and socially. While women 
are traditionally considered bearers of national 
culture, peasants have taken on an increasing 
importance in the Thai national imaginary with the 
globalization of the middle-class. As the middle 
class enjoys the "cosmopolitan" and the "modern" 
it seeks to anchor Thai identity in the rural 
peasantry. 
As peasant women, therefore, prostitute 
women are doubly marked as bearers of national 
culture. Their clear refusal to play their "proper 
roles" and to follow the direction of the middle and 
elite classes provokes anger and anxiety among 
these same classes, who feel the women should be 
disciplined into their "proper roles." The accusation 
of "consumerism" legitimizes such discipline by 
silencing the complex realities of prostitutes' lives 
and their demands for control over their own lives. 
The gendered process of globalization, therefore, 
has ironic consequences for women. While 
globalization has led to women's increased 
economic exploitation, the very critique of 
globalization through such discourses as 
"consumerism" would deny women political and 
social agency. While a nationalist response to 
globalization has opened up a political role for some 
- particularly elite - women, it has suppressed more 
radical politics by marginalized actors such as 
women in the sex-trade. 
ENDNOTES 
1. This article is a shortened and re-worked version of a chapter in: Leslie Jeffrey, Sex and Borders: Gender, National Identity and 
Prostitution Policy in Thailand. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2002. 
2. In the interests of space and time I have not gone into the details of the development of prostitution in Thailand here. Such an analysis 
has been provided in several sources including Thahn-dam Truong's Sex, Money and Morality, London: Zed, 1990. For more recent 
analyses of prostitution that move beyond political economy, see, for example, Lenore Manderson, "Public Sex Performances in Patpong 
and Exploration of the Edges of Imagination," Journal of Sex Research 29.4 (1992): 451-75; and Penny van Esterik Materializing 
Thailand. New York: Berg, 2000. 
3. Prostitution was criminalized in Thailand in 1960 with the passage of the Prostitution Prohibition Act, although in 1966 the 
government passed the Entertainment Places Act which allowed for the use of "special service girls" (a widely understood euphemism 
for sex-workers) in places of entertainment as a bow to the entertainment industry built around the American military. Sex-workers 
remained vulnerable to arrest and fines or detention according to the whims (and political/financial interests) of officials. In 1996 the 
government further extended criminal law on prostitution by including clients of under-age girls and parents who sold their children into 
prostitution in the Criminal Code, while continuing to penalize sex-workers. 
4.1 have used the term "trafficking" (as well as "prostitution" rather than "sex-work") here as that is how it was constructed in Thailand 
at the time. However, it was soon recognized that the reality of the international movement of women in the sex-trade, including Thai 
women, was much more complicated and often involved a certain amount of "choice" rather than simple "force." Certainly, the 
international debate over trafficking has involved many sex-workers and pro-sex work feminists who have provided excellent critiques 
of the term and the politics surrounding its usage. See, for example, the collection of articles in Kamala Kempadoo and Jo Doezma, eds. 
Global Sex Workers: Rights Resistance and Redefinition. New York: Routledge, 1998. On Thai migrant sex-workers specifically see 
Satoko Watenabe, "From Thailand to Japan: Migrant Sex Workers as Autonomous Subjects" in the above collection and Siripora 
Skrobanek, et al., The Traffic in Women: Human Realities of the International Sex Trade. New York: Zed Books, 1997. 
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